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Tan: Right to Counsel

ROCKLAND COUNTY COURT

People v. Clark'
(printed September 26, 2003)

Judith Clark was convicted in 1983 of felony murder,
robbery and related crimes.2 She was sentenced to prison for three
consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life on the felony murder
charges with three terms of twelve and one-half to twenty-five
years on the robbery charges. Shortly before jury selection, Clark
elected to proceed pro se.'

In 2003, although Clark chose to

represent herself in the 1983 trial, she appealed her conviction
claiming that she had a constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel pursuant to the United States Constitution and the New
York State Constitution.'

The Rockland County Court affirmed

Clark's sentence since she did not raise this appeal until twenty
years later; and hence, her claim was procedurally barred for
consideration pursuant to Section 440.10(2)(c)7 of the Criminal
lN.Y.L.J., Sept. 26, 2003, at 32 (Rockland County Ct., Sept. 26, 2003).
2id.

3Id.
4id.

5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "In any trial
in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and
with counsel. .... "
7 N.Y. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW § 440.10(2)(c) (McKinney 1994) provides
in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision one, the court
must deny a motion to vacate a judgment when ... although
sufficient facts appear on the record [to permit an appeal,] no
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Procedure Law.' The court also found that even if the appeal was
not procedurally barred, the trial court did not err in granting
Clark's request to proceed pro se.9
Clark, along with six other accomplices, was indicted for
armed robbery of a Brinks armored truck and for felony murder
when one Brinks guard and two police officers died as a result of a
shootout with the police.'" Clark was represented by an attorney
during pre-trial proceedings. However, before the commencement
of jury selection, Clark petitioned to proceed pro se. Before Clark
was permitted to proceed pro se, the trial court asked a series of
questions to determine whether she understood the consequences
of her request and whether she was competent to represent
herself." Clark informed the court that she had previously worked
for Legal Aid, and felt that no one could speak on her behalf
because she was a "freedom fighter." She further acknowledged
that if she were to proceed pro se an attorney would be available
for consultation, but would not be free to appear and speak on
2
Clark's behalf.'

such appellate review or determination occurred owing to the
defendant's unjustifiable failure to take or perfect an appeal
during the prescribed period or to his unjustifiable failure to
raise such ground or issue upon an appeal actually perfected
by him...
8 Clark,supra note 1, at 32.
9 Clark,supra note 1, at 32.
'0Clark, supra note 1, at 32.
1 Clark, supra note 1, at 32.
12 Clark, supra note 1, at 32.
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol20/iss1/10
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The trial court found Clark to be competent and accepted

her application to proceed pro se. 3 She participated in the voir
dire process sporadically and at times heard the trial proceedings in
her holding cell when she was voluntarily absent from the
courtroom.

Although Clark was absent at times from the

courtroom, she was afforded the opportunity to speak with the
judge when the need arose.'4 After the trial, the jury returned a
guilty verdict and Clark was sentenced to prison.
appeal her conviction until twenty years later.

She did not
The Rockland

County Court affirmed both the trial judge's decision to allow
Clark to proceed pro se and her conviction. 5
In its analysis, the Rockland County Court relied on the
United States Supreme Court case, Faretta v. California,6 and
found that a "defendant has a constitutional right to selfrepresentation."' 7 Although the United States Constitution does
not explicitly confer this right to defendants in criminal trials, the
courts have found it to be implicit. 8
In Faretta,the defendant was charged with grand theft.' 9
Although the judge appointed a public defender, the defendant

1 Clark, supra note 1, at 32.
14Clark, supra

note 1, at 32.

15 Clark, supra note 1, at 32.

422 U.S. 806, 812 (1975) ("In the federal courts, the right of selfrepresentation has been protected by statute since the beginnings of our
16

Nation.").

17Clark,

supra note 1, at 32.

'sFaretta,

422 U.S. at 819 ("Although not stated in the [Sixth] Amendment in

so many words, the right to self-representation

. . . is .. . implied by the

structure of the Amendment.").
'9Id. at 807.
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requested to proceed pro se.2 In questioning by the judge, Faretta
revealed that he had represented himself in a prior criminal
prosecution and he had a high school education.2 ' Faretta also
stated to the judge that it was his belief the public defenders' office
was "very loaded down with ...a heavy case load."2" Although
the judge believed that Faretta was making a mistake, he
nonetheless accepted Faretta's request to proceed pro se with the
condition that he reserved the right to reverse this ruling if it was
later shown that Faretta could not adequately represent himself.23
Several weeks thereafter, the judge questioned the defendant
regarding particular rules of evidence and the applicable rules to
challenge a potential juror. 2' The judge considered the defendant's
answers and concluded that he "had not made an intelligent and
25
knowing waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel.
Furthermore, the judge concluded that the defendant did not have a
constitutional right to represent himself.26 As a result, the judge
reversed his prior ruling and re-assigned a public defender to the
case.

27

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed
Faretta's conviction, 2" holding that the Sixth Amendment "implies

20 id.
21id.
22 Id.

23 Faretta,422 U.S. at 807-08.
24

Id. at 808.

25 Id. at 809-10.

Id.
Id. at 810.
28
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836.
26
27
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a right of self-representation."' 9 The Court reasoned that it is the
defendant who ultimately will "bear the personal consequences of
a conviction."3

Therefore, the defendant should be free to decide

if an attorney would be to his advantage.3
The mere existence of an implied constitutional right to
self-representation does not automatically render every defendant
the right to proceed pro se whenever the desire to do so arises.
The Supreme Court reasoned that self-representation means that
the defendant will not have the "traditional benefits associated with
the right to counsel."3
request to

Therefore, a trial judge, before granting a

self-representation,

must determine

whether the

defendant "knowingly and intelligently forgo[es] those traditional
benefits."33 The defendant must be made aware of the "dangers
'
and disadvantages of self-representation."34

The record must

establish that the defendant "knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open.""

Applying this standard to

Faretta, the Court concluded that the trial judge gave an adequate
warning with regard to the dangers of proceeding pro se and that
Faretta was competent to self-representation.36 Therefore, the trial

29 Id. at

821.

30 Id.at 834.

31 id.
32 Id. at 835.
31 Faretta,422

U.S. at 835 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65

(1938)).
34 id.

35 Id. (citing Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
36 Id. at 835-36.
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court erred in denying his constitutional right to represent
himself."
The New York courts' standard in determining whether a
defendant may proceed pro se is very similar to the federal
standard. In a criminal case, a defendant may invoke the right of
self-representation provided: ."(1) the request is unequivocal and
timely asserted, (2) there has been a knowing and intelligent
waiver of the right to counsel, and (3) the defendant has not
engaged in conduct which would prevent the fair and orderly
exposition of the issues."" The "unequivocal" element under the
first requirement seeks to prevent convicted defendants from
perverting the criminal system by seeking appeals on the basis that
their right to self-representation was denied.39

Therefore, a

defendant's request for self-representation must be "clearly and
unconditionally presented to the trial court."4

In regard to the

timeliness of the request, the New York Court of Appeals has
stated that apro se request is timely when it is submitted before the
commencement of the trial.'
Turning to the second

requirement,

the competent,

voluntary and intelligent waiver, the New York courts look to the
United States Supreme Court's standard. When a defendant asserts
his or her right of self-representation, he or she in effect disavows
the right to counsel afforded under the Federal and New York
17 Id. at

38

836.
People v. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d 322, 327 (N.Y. 1974).

39
Id.
40
41

id.
id.
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Constitutions.42 Due to the grave nature of waiving a constitutional
right and proceeding pro se, a trial court must conduct a searching
inquiry

to determine

whether the "defendant's

unequivocal, voluntary and intelligent."43

waiver

is

First, the trial judge

must determine whether the defendant is competent to proceed pro
se.

Factors such as a "defendant's age, education, occupation,

previous exposure to legal procedures" should be used to
determine the defendant's competency."
achieve an adequate

inquiry,

Second, in order to

there must be evidence

to

demonstrate that the defendant has knowledge of "what they are
doing and that choices are exercised with 'eyes open."' 45 The
defendant must be informed of the dangers and advantages of
waiving his or her right to counsel. '

The trial judge must

adequately warn a defendant of the inherent risks involved in selfrepresentation. 7 Finally, the inquiry and the warning must also be
on the record to provide sufficient information for appeal."'
The New York Court of Appeals has shed light on how a
trial judge may fail to meet the searching inquiry requirement. In
People v. Slaughter,49 the jury convicted the defendant of felony
murder and attempted robbery in the first degree."

Defendant,

Id.
People v. Smith, 705 N.E.2d 1205, 1207 (N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 1208.
Id. See Faretta,422 U.S. at 835 (citing Adams, 317 U.S. at 279).
46
Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1207.
47 Id. at 1208.
41 Id. at 1207.
4' 583 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1991).
42

41
44
45

51 Id. at 921.
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along with three accomplices, attempted to rob a warehouse but
failed when an employee called the police." They fled the scene in
a van, but the defendant was apprehended. 2 A suppression hearing
was ordered, but before the commencement of the hearing, the
defendant requested a new court appointed attorney. 3 The hearing
court refused, and thereafter the defendant made a written
application for the appointment of new counsel which the court
also denied. 4 Finally, during the last two days of the suppression
hearing, the defendant refused to cooperate with his counsel;
thereafter, the court informed the defendant that he could proceed
pro se if he no longer wanted to be represented by his counsel."
The defendant then proceeded pro se during the hearing and the
evidence was admitted.'

The defendant was represented by

counsel during the trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict, and the
defendant subsequently appealed."
On appeal, one of the issues presented was whether the
hearing court failed to provide a sufficient searching inquiry when
the defendant elected to proceed pro se.58 The New York Court of
Appeals found ample evidence to suggest that the hearing court did
fail to make a searching inquiry. 9 The hearing court failed to

5' Id.
52 Id.
53

id.

54 Slaughter, 583 N.E.2d at 921.

55 Id. at 921-22.
16 Id. at 922.
57 Id.
5' Id. at 921.
59
Slaughter, 583 N.E.2d at 923.
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol20/iss1/10
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ensure that the defendant knew of the "dangers and disadvantages
of proceeding without counsel"; rather, the court only informed the
defendant that if he were to proceed pro se, he would not receive
any assistance from the court.'

As a result of the hearing court's

failure to fulfill the searching inquiry requirement, the defendant's
waiver was ineffective.6

The Court of Appeals reversed and

remanded the case for a new suppression hearing.62
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals has also found
waiver of the right to counsel ineffective in other contexts.

In

People v. Mitchell,63 the court held that informing the defendant
that "he was entitled to be represented by counsel and that one
would be appointed if he could not afford one" does not constitute
a searching inquiry; and hence, the waiver of counsel was
ineffective.'

In People v. Kaltenbach,65 the court held that

informing the defendant that he "was entitled to be represented by
a lawyer; that he was facing a serious charge; and that, if
convicted, he could receive a year's imprisonment" did not
constitute a searching inquiry.'

In People v. Sawyer,67 the court

held that informing the defendant that he was "facing a very
serious charge and that [his] own best interests [were] probably

6 Id.

id.
Id. at 924.
63 463 N.E.2d 1207 (N.Y. 1984).
" Id. at 1209.
65 457 N.E.2d 791 (N.Y. 1983).
66
Id.at 792.
67 438 N.E.2d 1133 (N.Y. 1982).

61

62
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served by having a lawyer represent [him]" did not fulfill the
searching inquiry requirement.6"
The existence of a timely request and a finding of a
competent, voluntary and intelligent waiver does not automatically
give a defendant an absolute right to proceed pro se.69 A defendant
may forfeit his or her right to proceed pro se if he or she engages
"in disruptive or obstreperous conduct."7

A forfeiture of the right

to self-representation may result when a defendant intentionally
acts in such a way as to "undermine, upset or unreasonably delay
the progress of the trial."'" However, if a trial judge provokes a
defendant to produce an outburst, the defendant does not forfeit his
72

or her right of self-representation.

Applying these factors to the instant case, the Rockland
County Court affirmed Clark's sentence.73 In its analysis, the court
concluded that the trial court conducted an adequate searching
inquiry.74

The record demonstrated that Clark knew the

disadvantages of proceeding pro se.

Clark appeared to be

intelligent and well educated; and hence, her waiver was
voluntarily and intelligently made.

Clark's decision to absent

herself from some parts of the trial to make a political statement

681d.at 1138.
69
Mclntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327.

70Id.at 327-28.
71 Id.
at 328.
72 Id.
73 Clark, supranote
74 Clark, supranote

1, at 32.
1, at 32.
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did not render her original decision to proceed pro se involuntary. 7
As such, Clark's sentence was affirmed.76
In conclusion, both the Federal and State Constitutions
guarantee a defendant the right to self-representation.
the right to self-representation

However,

is implicit in the Federal

Constitution; whereas, the New York State Constitution explicitly
and unambiguously affords a defendant this right. 77 Despite this
difference, the searching inquiry standard that is required to
determine whether a defendant can proceed pro se is similar in
both the federal and state courts.78

Lauren Tan

'5 Clark, supra note 1, at 32.
76 Clark, supra note 1, at 32.
77 People v. Rosen, 613 N.E.2d 946, 948 (N.Y. 1993).
:1 See Faretta,422 U.S. at 835; Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1208.
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